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COSTS IN LITIGATION WHEN THE UNITED STATES
IS A PARTY: A MODEST PROPOSAL*
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INTRODUCTION

U

NDER EXISTING LAW, the United States is not liable for
paying costs whether successful in litigation or not, but it is
entitled to recover its costs from an unsuccessful party-litigant. In
this article, various federal statutory provisions arid rules will be
examined and applicable cases will be analyzed in an endeavor to
determine whether this one-sided treatment of costs is based upon sound
principles of law.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

At English common law, costs were never awarded unless some
statutory authorization existed.1 It was believed that defendant was
sufficiently punished and plaintiff adequately rewarded, by payment
of damages, or performance of the act, ordered by the court. The
first English statute to be passed on the subject, authorized the award
of costs to a successful plaintiff; a later enactment resulted in
authorization of an award for the successful party, whether he be
plaintiff or defendant. 2 Finally, the common law rule was modified so
that it coincided with the then prevailing equity rule, that determination of who should be entitled to costs was a matter which was to be
determined by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.'
The basic rules requiring statutory authorization exist in the
United States today and, absent legislative expression on the subject of costs, there exists no inherent power in state courts to award
costs, even to a successful party.' Prior to the enactment of our
present federal statutes and rules, however, the power of federal
* This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Laws at Georgetown University.
t Legal Assistant, National Labor Relations Board. Member Illinois and District of Columbia Bars. A.B., LL.B., University of Illinois; LL.M., Georgetown
University.
1. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769 (1883); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J.

849, 851-854 (1924). See 14 Am. JUR., Costs §§ 6-9.
2. 1607, 4 Jac. 1, c. 3.
3. Goodhart, supra note 1 at 854.
4. See Antoni v. Gteenhow, 107 U.S. 769 (1883).
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courts to award costs was derived, not from enabling legislation, but
from "usage long continued and confirmed by implication from provisions in many statutes."5 Thus, the federal courts followed the
pattern set by the English statutes, awarding costs as a matter of
course to the prevailing party in an action at law, and in its discretion,
in actions which were equitable in nature. Even today, this basic
and traditional practice is continued," except where such action is
prohibited by the terms of a specific statute.
There are numerous statutory provisions relating to costs and
fees' but, as previously noted, this article is concerned solely with
those pIovisions which bear on litigation involving the United States
as a party. The basic statutory provision which deals with costs in
actions brought by or against the United States is section 2412(a)
of title 28 of the United States Code which provides: "The United
States shall be liable for fees and costs only when such liability is
expressly provided for by Act of Congress."' This section must be
read in conjunction with rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter referred to as FRCP) which provides:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in
a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; but costs against the United States, its officers, and
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It has been held that the enactment of these provisions did not result
in a change in the common law principles relating to costs; rather
5. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 316 (1920). The Court's reference to "many
statutes" was descriptive of the vast body of precedent established under English
legislative enactments and not federal legislation. See also Newton v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924).
6. National Transformer Corp. v. France Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 343 (6th Cir.
1954); Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 139 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Hansen v. Bradley, 114 F. Supp. 382 (D. Md.
1953).
7. Fees and costs are covered in chapter 123 of title 28 of the United States
Code, §§ 1911-1929, which broadly cover the Supreme Court, § 1911; circuit courts
of appeal, § 1913; and the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals, § 1926. In addition,
there are some provisions in the chapter devoted to the district courts, particularly
§§ 1914, 1917-1919, which complement the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
8. See also section 2408 which provides that "security for damages or costs shall
not be required of the United States. . .

."

An exception to the general rule of

subsection (a) of section 2412 occurs in subsection (b) of that section, which provides that when "the United States puts in issue the plaintiff's right to recover"
in a suit brought under subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Tucker Act suits in
the District Courts) or § 1491 (Tucker Act suits in the Court of Claims), costs
may be allowed to the prevailing party, but limited to only those costs expended on
witnesses and fees paid to the clerk. Another exception may be found in section
2412(c), which provides that in suits brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), costs are to be allowed "in all courts to the successful
claimant, but such costs shall not include attorney's fees."
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these provisions were merely declaratory of what had been common
custom and practice.9
As is clear from the title, the FRCP are applicable only to the
United States District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(c) provides that
"each district court by rule or standing order may require advance
payment of fees."'" And FRCP, rule 83, which authorizes the district
courts to make and amend rules, provides that even where the courts
have not provided a local rule, the practice of the courts is to be locally
regulated in a manner not inconsistent with the FRCP.
Section 1913 of title 28 provides that the fees and costs in the
circuit courts of appeal are to be set by the Judicial Conference of the
United States, and that "such fees and costs shall be reasonable and
uniform in all the circuits." Accordingly, each of the eleven circuit
courts has a rule respecting costs which, although varying in language
from circuit to circuit, basically provides that costs may not be taxed
either for or against the United States."
Finally, the Supreme Court, in its local rule 57-7, adopted on
April 12, 1954, provided: "No costs shall be allowed in this court
either for or against the United States or an officer or agency thereof,
except where specially authorized by statute and directed by the
court." Thus, pursuant to explicit statutory principles, as expressed
in 28 U.S.C. § 2412, all federal courts have followed the pre-existing
practice of affording to the sovereign, immunity from costs, except
where Congress directs otherwise.
Now it may be stated that the rationale underlying 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412, is of a twofold character. The traditional basis relates to
the old English view of the "king's prerogative" and the immunity of
the sovereign. Under that doctrine, it is contended that it is solely
within the sovereign's power to decide whether or not to consent to
suit, and that when the sovereign does so consent, it may do so on
9. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Menihan Corp., 111 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.
1941), aff'd, 312 U.S. 81 (1941). See 3A OHLINGZR, FEDERAL PRAcTIcn 266 (1954),

where the Advisory Committee's notes are set forth. See also In re Peterson, 253
U.S. 300 (1920), for discussion of common law rules relating to costs.
10. See e.g., D. MAss. R. 13, as to security for costs. Obviously no local rule
relating to costs where the United States is a party is required under district court
practice since rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs all
practice in those courts.
11. D.C. Cis. R. 20 (e) (no costs for or against the United States except
where authorized by statute and directed by court); lsT Cis. R. 33(5) (same,

except where specifically authorized by statute and then only when directed by
court); 2D Cm. R. 27(b) (same, except where otherwise provided by statute or
specially directed by this court) ; 3D Crs. R. 35(5) (same, except that where the

United States or officer is a party, where a joint appendix is included, the party
designating its inclusion in the record - appellee or respondent - will be taxed for
the actual cost to petitioner or appellant); 4TH CmR. R. 21(5) (same, except
where authorized by statute and directed by the court) ; 5TH Cm.R. 31(4) (same) ;
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whatever terms and conditions it deems fitting. Thus, under the
English common law, in suits brought for or against the sovereign,
the king neither paid nor collected costs.' 2 Although there is currently a trend away from this strict doctrine, there is no question that
it still haunts the courts and exists as the basic rationale for giving the
government its preferred position in litigation. An expression of
what might be termed the more modern view, or second basis, was
enunciated in Walling v. Norfolk & So. Ry.,' 3 where Judge Parker
said,
The rule is based, not upon any antiquated theory of divine
right of kings or governments, but upon the practical consideration that, since public moneys cannot be paid out except under
an appropriation by Congress, the courts will not enter against
the government a judgment for costs which would require the
payment of moneys from the public treasury, unless they are
expressly authorized by Congress to do so.4
As previously noted, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is still
being discussed and applied in determining whether the government
will recognize a particular cause of action, or even if the cause of
action is recognized, whether any forum will recognize it.' " But, is
it not reasonable to conclude that once the government has consented
to suit such consent should be construed as a waiver of its immunity
from costs? While recognizing that in the usual situation waiver as
to part should not be construed as waiver of the whole, should not
an exception be made where an inequitable or unfair result would
obtain? Should we impute to Congress, an intention not to waive
the government's immunity from costs where such non-waiver would
operate to the detriment of one of its wards? The general principles
of law relating to costs permit a court, in its discretion, to order the
CIR. R. 23(4) (same); 7T H CIR. R. 27(d) (same, except where specially
authorized by statute and directed by the court); 8TH- CIR. R. 17(c) (same; 9TH
CIR. R. 25(4) (same) ; 10TH CIR. R. 26(4) (same).
12. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 400 (Lewis' ed. 1897), cited in 6 MOORZ,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1339 (2d ed. 1953). However, the United States has not followed the fair application of sovereign immunity in all cases, as was the practice in
England. The policy of the United States courts is to tax costs in favor of the
United States but not against it; the exceptions being in the circuit courts where
pursuant to local rules, supra note 11, each circuit provides that the United States,
even if the prevailing party, shall not recover costs. See Pine River Logging Co.
v. United States, 186 U.S. 279, 296 (1902) ; United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S.
213, 219 (1896) ; Locke v. United States, 1 F.R.D. 431 (W.D. Mich. 1940).
13. 162 F.2d 95, 96 (4th Cir. 1947). Cy. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11. How.)
272, 290 (1850); Board of Public Utility Comm'rs v. Plainfield-Union Water Co.,
6TH

30 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1929).
14. See also Aycrigg v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Cal. 1954).

15. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) ; Soriano v. United
States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957); National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356 (1955) ; United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 20 (1926).
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unsuccessful party to reimburse the opposing party; where the government consents to suit, has it not placed itself in the same position as
any other individual party-litigant? And if not, at least with respect to
costs, which is one of the usual incidents of litigation, why not?
Would not more individuals be encouraged to prosecute meritorious
claims if they were assured that they would have an opportunity to
recover their costs and disbursements if successful? Did the Congress
desire to stifle the opportunity of its citizens to test the legality of
governmental operations by tightening its purse strings? These are
examples of considerations which Congress might reasonably have
been expected to explore before enacting legislation which caused
such inquiries to be made.
Returning to the quoted language of the Walling case, it is
interesting to note that this rationale was relied upon to avoid taxing
the government for costs since, although it initiated the proceedings,
it failed to succeed in the litigation. The rationale upon which Judge
Parker relied superficially makes sense. It recognizes that when the
United States is unsuccessful it would have to have some authorization
before it could reimburse the prevailing party. But what about when
the United States is the prevailing party? Under rule 54(d), costs
are allowed to the "prevailing party" as of course, and that provision has been construed to include the government."6 Judge Parker
did not provide a more satisfactory explanation when he rejected
sovereign immunity since it still appears that in all litigation involving
the United States, the government has everything to gain if successful and nothing to lose if unsuccessful.
In sum, it appears that sovereign immunity is the underlying
rationale of section 2412 and the rules enacted pursuant thereto.
In Walling, Judge Parker seemingly rejected this theory and substituted what he deemed to be a more practical, more tenable basis
for adhering to the mandate of Congress as expressed in the Code.
It is submitted that whatever reasons may have existed to warrant the
traditional recognition that the sovereign be given preference, such
reasons lack merit today. Absent a statutory change, however, the
16. Asher v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Cal. 1939), aff'd, 111 F.2d
59 (9th Cir. 1940). In Locke v. United States, 1 F.R.D. 431 (W.D. Mich. 1940),
the court said: "[P]rior to the adoption of the Federal Rules . . . the right of the
United States, when it was the prevailing party in a law action, to recover costs
was well established, even though costs could not be recovered against the United
States in the reverse situation. . . . This principle has been modified by the
provisions of Rule 54(d) . . . , which authorizes the court to direct to the contrary.
Such a direction should be made, however, only in those cases where there are
equitable considerations sufficiently strong to overcome the general rule." See also
Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279 (1902); Love v. Royall,
179 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1950); Reynolds v. Wade, 140 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D.C.
Alaska 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 249 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1957).
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courts are powerless to effect a balance; any equalization will have to
be the result of congressional manipulation. Accordingly, it is recommended that the following arguments be considered from the viewpoint
of whether either the common law theory of sovereign immunity or
Judge Parker's "appropriation from Congress" theory is sound, as
a preliminary matter for determining whether a statutory amendment
is warranted.

THE CASE FOR AMENDMENT

One of the first arguments indicating that abolition of the costs
distinction is warranted is that the United States today is like the
average business enterprise. Realistically viewed, the government has
two motives and goals when it engages in litigation; it is interested
in seeing that justice is done and that no one is disadvantaged by
the preferred position occupied by the sovereign, and it is also interested in winning the suit in its own right, just as any other litigant.
It is to be recognized that quite often the United States enters the
courts to enforce some statute passed for the benefit of the public at
large. For example, under the National Labor Relations Act, the
government may be required to seek court enforcement of its administrative orders which were issued on behalf of an aggrieved member
of society. But there are also other instances where the United States
sues or defends in its own right because it has an interest in the outcome - an interest which is significantly of the type which does not directly benefit anyone other than the government, as for example, where
the United States is sued directly to collect a refund on taxes paid
under protest, or where an individual commences a partition action
to divide property which is held jointly with the United States. (See
28 U.S.C. § 2409). Clearly the United States, in defending such
actions, is acting out of self-interest, even though it may be argued that
it had no choice since it was compelled to defend. Yet the rule that
it is not to be liable for costs prevails. Since costs are taxed to
make the successful party whole for the expenditures incurred in
asserting or defending his rights, whether the individual successfully
defends an action commenced by the United States or recovers judgment in a suit commenced by '' him to correct a wrong done by the
United States, it would seem consistent with fair play that the
government make him whole. Certainly where the United States has
entered the sphere of commercial activity, for example, as a lessor,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss2/3
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insurer or creditor,1" and acquires benefits and rights which are
exactly of the same quality which business men are often called upon
to assert or defend, justice would seem to demand that the government be willing to accept the possible detriments which every other
litigant is required to accept.'"
A second argument, somewhat related to the first, is that although many potential litigants do not pay any attention to the matter
of costs when initially considering the possibility of suing the United
States, to those who do consider the matter, the present law is likely
to operate as a deterrent from such action. 9 Perhaps this is good. If
an individual is deterred by the financial burden of paying costs to
the United States, should he lose, the claim very probably is not of
sufficient importance to outweigh the threat of detriment. Yet, is
this the kind of pressure which Congress felt was appropriate for
the United States to bring to bear on its citizens? One would certainly hope that such was not the intent. But is it not the effect?
Further, it is not to be overlooked that as a matter of fact, costs
may climb to a very substantial figure and in situations involving suit
against the United States, this is a very real deterrent which significantly would not be present in the usual non-governmental type of
litigation. Assuming that suit against the United States is commenced
at the district court level, by the time statutory docket and filing
fees are assessed and costs for printing or preparing briefs are paid,
the outlay may be considerable. Further, there is always the possibility
that the matter may advance to a court of appeals, and from there to
17. See Standard Oil Co. v. Apex Oil Corp., 35 Tenn. App. 225, 244 S.W.2d
176 (1951), where the United States filed a claim for taxes in a creditor's suit and
lost. It was held that absent a statute authorizing costs against the United States,
it could not be taxed.
18. To some extent Congress has attempted to balance the scales when the
government engages in extra-governmental business activities (query whether really
extra-governmental). See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Menihan Corp., 111 F.2d
940 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 312 U.S. 31 (1941), where RFC, a corporate instrumentality endowed with many of the attributes of a private corporation, including
the power to sue and the liability to be sued, was held liable for the payment of
costs which were but an ordinary incident of the suit. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit said that as long as a money judgment against the corporation
was expressly authorized by the statute (authority to sue and be sued), no immunity
would be inferred "with respect to the additional sum that would normally be
added to the judgment as costs." 111 F.2d at 942. Compare Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Corson Realty Co., 21 N.J. Misc. 146, 32 A.2d 174 (Hudson Co. Cir.
1943), with Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Casady, 106 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1939).

Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Menihan Corp., supra, was followed in Walling
v. Crown Overall Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1945) and Walling v. McCracken
County Peach Growers Ass'n, 50 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
19. This textual discussion assumes that the individual does not proceed in
forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
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the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court alone, fees running well
over one hundred dollars would not be unusual."0
It is also true that many potential law suits are avoided by
amicable settlement between the parties; this is often the case where
the issues are evenly balanced or the outcome would not necessarily
be clearly predictable. But, where novel or important issues, from
which grave consequences might follow, are presented, both parties
may be loath to settle. In situations of this sort, a potential litigant
might prefer to take his chances in court, knowing that if he wins
he will be reimbursed by the unsuccessful resisting party. Yet where
the situation involves the United States, because of the provision of
the Code, an individual might be considered well-advised to accept
settlement from the government on any terms it might make available.
If one of Congress' purposes was to discourage litigation and to encourage settlement, the provision of section 2412 may well be
achieving that goal. However, one can only speculate as to the number of meritorious causes which, although perhaps involving only
insignificant amounts of money, would have raised important legal
issues which have yet to be answered, and would have been presented
to the courts for judicial determination but for the deterrent effect of
the statute. Who knows how many claims against the United States
have been withdrawn or never presented at all because of reluctance
to invest sums which might be ten times greater than the amounts
sought to be recovered?
Another argument rests upon the language of rule 54(d) which
seems to be at variance with Judge Parker's policy argument, as expressed in Walling. The rule states that "costs shall be allowed as
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs."
(Emphasis supplied.) The italicized language is no more than a
recognition of the inherent power of equity courts to award costs, and
its presence in the rule is equivalent to an extension of that equitable
power to the district courts when sitting as courts of law. 2' Thus, although it is clear that so long as the United States is not the prevailing
party it may not be taxed for costs, there is nothing here which
20. See U.S. SUP. CT. R. 52(a), which provides that a fee of $100 is to be
imposed for docketing a case on appeal. This figure is to be increased to $150 when
oral argument is permitted.
21. Except where some statute or rule provides otherwise, district courts are
given the discretionary power not to award costs to the prevailing party. United
States v. Bowden, 182 F.2d 251, 252 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Harris v. Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp., 139 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Hansen v. Bradley, 114 F. Supp. 382
(D. Md. 1953); Farrar v. Farrar, 106 F. Supp. 238, 241 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
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prevents a court from concluding that the United States, despite its
success in the litigation, should not be reimbursed.2 2
Judge Parker's rationale, however, seems to smack of an assertion
that there is an inherent lack of power in a court to tax the United
States for costs; an assertion which flies in the face of the rule which
recognizes and expressly authorizes a court to exercise discretion in
the matter. The grant of power to exercise discretion must necessarily
recognize that so long as not abused, the court's lawful orders must
be complied with. This, in addition, would recognize that in furtherance of the grant the court retains the corollary power to enforce
its orders. Naturally, in the absence of a statute authorizing the court
to tax the United States for costs, any order to that effect would
be an abuse of discretion as well as an ultra vires action. But, if
such a statute exists, then an award of costs against the United States
is not only pursuant to a lawful mandate but within the scope of the
court's enforcing power. Judge Parker may have been aware of this
but his statement in Walling did not reconcile the situation there
presented with the situation posed here. Where the statute does
permit an award of costs against the sovereign, did Judge Parker
envision a separate congressional appropriation each time such an
order was made? If he did, he was in error, for there is no evidence
to support such a position.
As noted, the courts may, in their discretion, refuse to award costs
to the United States even though it prevails. However, in actual
practice, courts generally adhere to the general rule that costs shall be
allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course, unless there are
sufficiently strong equitable considerations for denying reimbursement.23 Thus, where the United States prevails, it gets its costs unless
the opposing party is able to sustain his heavy burden of coming forth
with compelling reasons for denying reimbursement. The courts could
alleviate this one-sided situation, since such a burden is not placed on
the United States when it loses the battle, by a concerted refusal to
exercise their discretion in favor of the United States when it prevails,
24
but they are apparently not inclined to reach such a balanced result.
22. United States v. Erie R. Co., 200 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1952); United States
v. Bowden, supra note 21.
23. See note 16, supra.
24. As will be discussed under the heading "Attorney's Fees as an Item of
Costs", infra, in some instances the courts do award costs for and against the
government by considering the disbursements made as constituting "expenses" or
"conditions." In the cases commenced in the circuit courts, the decisions make no
attempt to reconcile these awards with the courts' rules against taxing costs either
"for or against the United States." Even in contempt matters, where the courts
specifically permit the taxing of "costs" in favor of the United States, the courts
do not, in any way, advert to the local rules w!hich prohibit the award even in
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It cannot be said that courts are not aware of these inequities;

but awareness alone does not amount to solution. While sophisticated
judges may reject one outmoded concept because no longer a virile
implement for reaching a decision, hasty action often does no more
than replace it with another equally unsatisfactory theory. In Walling,
Judge Parker rejected sovereign immunity as the basis for the government's non-liability for costs. Yet how much more satisfactory is his
substituted assertion that a congressional appropriation is necessary to
cover the matter of costs? When Congress decides on an amount which
it believes will meet the budgetary needs of a federal agency or department, it does not, nor could it with any accuracy, deduct therefrom
a projected figure which would constitute the amount of money which
that particular governmental body will recover as costs. The best that
Congress has been able to do to date is to estimate what the amount
to be appropriated should come to, based on salary levels of attorneys
and clericals presently employed - including recognition of normal
attrition and replacement problems - the estimated caseloads, and
a catch-all category known as operating expenses. Once Congress
has appropriated monies to an agency, that agency is free, within the
scope of its functional authority, to expend the monies in a manner
consistent with the objectives for which it was established. If it
exhausts its funds before the end of a fiscal year, it may seek a deficiency appropriation to permit it to continue functioning. The monies
which make up the appropriation are obtained from the United States
Treasury and, in the usual course of operations, any monies which
the agency receives - damages, fines, collections on debts, etc. - are
returned to that source. However, there is some basis for contending
that under certain circumstances the monies immediately disbursed or
received by an agency need not come from or be returned to the
Treasury. 25 Be that as it may, there does not appear to be any reason
favor of the United States. Thus, even though the courts could, in their discretion,
waive the operation of their local rules where the desired result warrants such
action (with the reservation that such result is not inconsistent with the FRCP),
the courts have consistently refrained from candidly expressing the reasons for
their variation from their "self-imposed" rules.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 2408, which provides that when, pursuant to Acts of Congress, the United States is taxed for costs, such sums are to be paid "out of the
contingent fund of the department or agency which directed the proceedings to be
instituted." (Emphasis supplied.) Conceivably then, when the United States is the
recipient of such sums, they are likewise to be deposited in the appropriate agency
or departmental fund. At least where the operative statute provides for the source
from which such governmental sums are to be withdrawn, if the United States
instituted the proceedings and is the losing party, it is not unreasonable to infer
that Congress intended the fund to be replenished by sums recovered from individuals
where the United States is the prevailing party. It is to be noted further, that by
a strict reading of section 2408, if the government did not institute or "direct the
proceedings to be instituted," costs would not be payable out of the contingent fund.
Thus, perhaps Congress was attempting to deter the governmental agency from
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why, as a practical matter, a governmental agency could not be required to reimburse a successful opponent without having a specific
appropriation from Congress for that purpose.
For example, when a governmental agency incurs expenses in
the taking of depositions, or in availing itself of recording services,
or in paying the travelling expenses of its witnesses, these monies
come out of the general funds appropriated by Congress and which the
agency allocates for such purposes. If the United States is successful,
these monies are recoverable. Thus the governmental agency has used
public funds, the sums appropriated, to cover expenses incidental to
litigation - costs; but it is being reimbursed by private funds, the
costs taxed to the unsuccessful individual. If these monies are turned
over to the Treasury, since it is said a governmental agency may not
use monies received from private sources, and the agency runs short
of funds during its fiscal year, any further appropriation might very
well be the same monies received from the individual. Yet these same
monies would now be properly allocable to the agency's use since
their private character has been removed by the mere passage through
the hands of the Treasury Department. Who said legal fictions are
obsolete? If, in addition, there is a statute which would render the
United States, through a particular agency, liable for costs if unsuccessful in litigation, it is quite possible that during any year in which that
agency loses a considerable number of cases, it will have depleted its
operating funds by virtue of court orders requiring it to reimburse
the prevailing party. In such circumstances, the agency would be
required to request additional appropriation from Congress. It is
submitted that this cumbersome situation fails to recognize or account
for the needs of a modern government which is constantly engaged in
litigation. The need for an appropriation, if Judge Parker was correct, impairs what might otherwise be an efficient process for closing
cases once the litigational phase is finished.
Yet, it is to be recalled that if an appropriation is necessary at
all, it is because Congress has enacted a statute which expressly
makes the United States liable for costs, for in the absence of statute
the problem of costs never arises since 28 U.S.C. § 2412, takes control. Therefore, even where the United States is liable for costs, coninstituting proceedings, initially and on appeal, where the likelihood of success was of
a doubtful character. This argument could be applied to the opposing private litigant
too, since if he institutes the proceedings, and wins, the government would not, by
the underscored portion of section 2408, be liable for costs. See also 15 Decisions

of the Comptroller General 82, 83 (1935)

where in response to a letter from the

Security and Exchange Commission, the Comptroller General authorized that agency
to pay expenses incurred in a reference to a master, including the master's fee, out
of its appropriated fund called "miscellaneous expenses."
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gressional action is required to alleviate the delays in complying with
a court order. It is further submitted however, that Congress has
intimated the means by which such a change in the Code could be
efficaciously worded so as to implement the provisions relating to
costs by making funds available for the payment of such assessments.
In 28 U.S.C. § 2408, Congress impliedly stated that no specific appropriation would be necessary for the United States to comply with
a taxed order to pay costs. In that section, Congress apparently
envisions costs as an ordinary incident of the litigation which, consistent with established common law principles, should be paid as
promptly as any other order or judgment. Conceivably, Congress
considered the fact that these agencies would have need for larger
appropriations to cover this additional litigational expense, and so
provided in its budgetary awards. Speculative as this may be, section
2408 does serve as ample illustration that where Congress does petmit costs to be taxed against the government, no additional appropriation is required each time it is so taxed. Thus, if this argument
is accepted and, in addition, it is generally agreed that the government's present immunity from costs is not realistically to be considered sound, being premised as it were on the archaic concept of the
"divine right of kings," we are left with no explanation for continued
adherence to the statutory provision which permits a disparity to
exist between the United States and other litigants.
Since there is no persuasive conceptually tenable basis for according preferential treatment to the United States when engaged in
litigation, it is suggested that the statute and the rules be amended to
eliminate the authorization for such disparity. Congress has eroded the
principle of sovereign immunity to a great extent by the passage of
many statutes which, in the particular area of governmental operations
involved, renders the United States liable for costs and fees; and in
many instances, the liability also includes authority for the taxation
of attorney's fees.26 It could be argued that since Congress has
waived the government's immunity from costs in so many statutes
that these exceptions have become tantamount to the rule itself, and
therefore no amendment to section 2412 is necessary. Such an argument overlooks the basic point that there is no reason for retaining
section 2412 in its present form; and to retain it at all is to recognize
that in those situations, be they few or many, where Congress has
26. See, e.q., 8 U.S.C. 45 (United States District Attorney liable for costs
where he fails to prosecute individuals who do not call Negroes for jury service)
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (c) (Tucker Act and Federal Tort Claims Act provisions);
28 U.S.C. § 2403 (Intervention of United States); 46 U.S.C. § 743 (Admiralty
cases) ; 46 U.S.C. § 782 (Public Vessels Act).
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not specially acted to make the United States liable, the general
immunity still prevails. However, in effecting a change in the provision, it is to be recognized that in this day and age when the
possibility for much paternalistic legislation is quite strong, it would
be just as easy for an over-zealous Congress to hold the United
States liable for costs in all cases, even when it is the prevailing party,
in order to encourage private parties to act as stopcocks on governmental action, i.e., to foster the commencement of judicial proceedings
where the facts indicate a possible over-reaching by the governmental
agency. However, it is believed that a middle-ground approach would
be more reasonable, more likely to pass, and more in accord with
fairly well established precedent.
At the very least, it is recommended that section 2412 be amended
to remove the United States from the favorable position which it
presently occupies, even though this result might not square with
established legal precedent. Under this proposal, which is here recommended as a minimum and not as the optimum solution, neither the
United States nor the individual would be entitled to reimbursement
for costs, regardless of which party prevails. This solution would be
at odds with the common law rule of allowing costs to the prevailing
party as a matter of course, but it would at least not place the individual in a position inferior to that occupied by the United States.
Thus, both the United States and the individaul would incur their
separate costs without any possibility of reimbursement. However, no
inequality would exist and each litigant would be fully aware of the
amounts which would have to be expended to resolve the legal question presented for the court's determination.
The preferred solution however, would be to amend section 2412
by excising the provision relating to governmenial immunity from
costs. Once this was accomplished, the United States would be in
the same position as any other individual involved in litigation and
the usual rule of allowing costs to the prevailing party would apply.
Obviously, this would additionally require amendment of rule 54(d)
and a similar change in the local rules of the Supreme and circuit
courts so as not to be inconsistent with federal law.
Further, it is recommended that in order to overcome any appropriation problem similar to the one raised in Walling, the amendments
should provide that receipts and disbursements be made to and from
an agency or department fund. This would avoid the questionable
arguments that a congressional appropriation is needed each time the
United States is ordered to pay costs. In establishing this fund rule,
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Congress should provide that each fund is intended to be selfsustaining and that it would be replenished by additional appropriations when there were insufficient amounts on hand to meet the current "costs" orders.17 Such a provision would also reduce, to a substantial extent, the delays which would inhere in a requirement for
congressional appropriation prior to payment. Can there be any
question that the successful party should be able to recover his costs
in the same amount of time as it takes the government to comply with
any other judicial order or judgment? There is no reason why the
individual litigant should be obliged to wait for Congress to deliberate
on whether to appropriate sums to pay specific judicially ordered
costs. And even if the congressional action were nothing more than
mere formality, it would still be less efficient than if the matter were
handled exclusively by the agency involved in the proceeding.
Thus, the requirement that a fund be maintained would eliminate
the collection and payment problems, and completely equalize the
unbalanced situation. Further, this proposed legislation would not do
violence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, if defense of the
proposition or preservation of the doctrine, is deemed necessary. The

proposed rules would become operative only after the government
consents to suit. The United States would still be immune from suit
in all cases except where it expressly consents.

However, once it

does become involved in litigation, the usual incidents would become
applicable to it, of which costs is but one. s
27. If this fund is also to serve as a pool into which the agency may dip to
meet its own expenses, costs, then additional appropriations, "deficiency appropriations," would be granted when an appropriate request was made. Although it is
recognized that Congress often takes a niggardly approach to budgetary matters,
it is highly unlikely that it would deny a request for additional funds where an
actual need is shown to exist. Conceding the reasonableness of the proposed
amendments, it could be argued that since one of the objects of the fund provision is to eliminate the need for seeking a congressional appropriation each time
the United States is taxed for costs, that once the fund is depleted, the agency
would still be required to go to Congress, and that therefore, the cumbersome procedure would still exist. Under this argument, the solution would be for Congress to
provide that the successful party would have an enforceable right only as long as
there is money in the fund, and that when the balance reaches zero, the agency is in
effect, judgment-proof. Or, in the alternative, when the fund reaches zero, the
individual must then wait until the agency is granted an additional appropriation.
This basic argument can readily be eliminated on two grounds: (1) that such an
amendment would be arbitrary and prejudicial to those individuals who prevailed in
litigation toward the end of each fiscal year when the agency's budgetary fund
would be at its lowest level; and (2) that since Congress would recognize the
argument made here, Congress would insure that each agency was granted a substantial appropriation in the first instance, and provide a speedy channel for affording each individual relief where the agency's fund is depleted before the end
of a fiscal year.
28. See the statement of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Menihan Corp., 111 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd,
312 U.S. 31 (1941).
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Professor Moore has defined costs as "an allowance, which the
law awards, usually but not always to the prevailing party and against
the losing party as an incident of the judgment, to reimburse a party
for certain expenses which he has incurred in the maintenance of the
action or the vindication of a defense." 2 9 This definition fairly well
coincides with what the preceding discussion has disclosed - that
under rule 54(d), since the court has discretion as to an award of
costs, they are "usually but not always" awarded and when awarded,
they go to the "prevailing party" whether such party be plaintiff or
defendant.
Although there are instances where exceptions may be found,
generally a federal court is empowered to tax a particular item as
included in costs only if such authority is found in a federal statute or
rule of court.8" There are four general statutory provisions which
should be noted in this regard: 8 1 (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1912, "where a
judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the
court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages
for his delay, and single or double costs." (Emphasis added); (2)
28 U.S.C. § 1927, "Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the pro-

ceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs."
(Emphasis added); (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1923, provides that attorney's
and proctor's docket fees may be taxed as costs, and contains specific
amounts which may be assessed; (4) 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides that
a judge or clerk may tax the following as costs:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the
stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for examplification and copies of papers necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance,
included in the judgment or decree. (Emphasis added.)
29. 6 MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 1301 (2d ed.

1953).

30. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924); In re Peterson, 253
U.S. 300 (1920) ; Swalley v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 168 F.2d 585 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949) ; Stallo v. Wagner, 245 Fed. 636 (2d
Cir. 1917); Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 161 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Wash.
1958).
31. For other statutory provisions dealing with costs, see 6 MOORE, FEDERAL,
PRACTICE 1317-1322 (2d ed. 1953).
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These provisions are framed in permissive terms, it will be noted,
and a court may allow as costs all or part or none of the items pro32
vided for in these sections.
Although "the allowance of taxable costs in the federal courts is
basically dependent upon the federal statutes supplemented . . . by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 3 there are items which the
courts allow even though no specific authorization is contained in the
statutes or rules. The following discussion will deal with attorneys'
fees insofar as they have been treated as an item of costs. Obviously, it
would be impossible to attempt statistically to dissect the means by
which courts have handled all of the incidents of litigation which we
generally place under the heading of costs. An attorney's fee, however,
is probably the greatest single disbursement which a litigant will be
called upon to make and, while it is usually not included in a judicial
award of costs, it demonstrates, perhaps better than any other single
item, how courts, in various contexts, have created exceptions to the
general common law rules of costs and even to Congress' mandate in
section 2412.
In Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hull, 34 the court stated, "Attorney's
fees can ordinarily be obtained by a prevailing party against an adverse party only by virtue of: - 1. A statute or rule of court, or 2. The
provisions of a written agreement or contract." Ample authority
exists to support the first point set out by the court. There are
numerous statutes which specifically provide for the allowance of
attorneys' fees"5 and, pursuant to the authorization of 28 U.S.C. § 1912,
supra, the Supreme Court in its rule 57-7, provides that "in appropriate instances, the court may adjudge double costs." As to the
court's second point, there are many cases in which courts have
recognized and respected contractual provisions providing for the
allowance of reasonable attorneys' fees." Thus, the Hull case ac32. See United States v. Erie R. Co., 200 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1952) ; United
States v. Bowden, 182 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1950); Dyker Bldg. Co. v. United
States, 182 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Shima v. Brown, 140 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir.
1943) ; Hansen v. Bradley, 114 F. Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1953).
33. Hansen v. Bradley, supra note 32.
34. 91 F. Supp. 65, 66 (S.D. Cal. 1950). See also Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851);
Gordon v. Woods, 202 F.2d 476, 480 (1st Cir. 1953) ; Maryland Cas. Co., v. United
States, 108 F.2d 784, 786 (4th Cir. 1940).
35. E.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 64 Stat. 1263 (1950), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1959); Ship Mortgage Act, 60 Stat. 1097 (1946), 46 U.S.C. § 941 (1959);
Merchant Marine Act, 49 Stat. 2015 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1959). See
generally collected

statutes in 6 MOORE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE

1317-1322

(2d

ed.

1953).
36. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 156 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1946)
Mercantile Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Southeast Arkansas Levee Dist., 106
F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hull, 91 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.

Cal. 1950). Cf. Gordon v. Woods, 202 F.2d 476 (1st Cir. 1953) ; United Pacific
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curately sets forth two bases upon which an allowance of attorneys'
fees is predicated. But a third basis, which the court there failed to
recognize and which is often relied upon, is the "original authority
of the chancellor to do equity in the particular situation. 3' 7 Although
the equitable basis is generally restricted to situations where a fund
is involved - creditor's suits,"' trust funds,3 9 and funds of a decedent's
estate4" - it has been extended to other situations as well, as where
"an unfounded action or defense is brought or maintained in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."'" An award
of costs, including attorney's fee, is quite common in contempt proceedings. As stated by the second circuit in Gordon v. Turco-Halvah
Co.,4 2 "[T]his is a proceeding for contempt, and .. . we do have the
power to make the plaintiff whole for all reasonable expense to
which he may have been put, including a counsel fee." In this respect,
it is of interest to note that although costs are generally treated as an
incident of litigation and ancillary to recovery of damages, in civil
contempt proceedings, insofar as the successful petitioner is concerned,
attorney's fees are treated as part of the substantive remedy. 3 However, as to the respondent, attorney's fees and other expenses are
treated as conventional costs, and recovery is allowed only where
reimbursement would have been recognized, as where the proceedings
were commenced in bad faith or vexatiously.44
Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 185 F.2d 443, 448 (10th Cir. 1950)
Trust Co. v. National Sur. Corp., 177 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1949).
37. Per Justice Frankfurter in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161,
166 (1939).
38. Trustees v. Greenhough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
39. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Rude v. Buchhalter,
286 U.S. 451 (1932) ; Mercantile Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Southeast Arkansas
Levee Dist., 106 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1939).
40. Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank, 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 775 (1945).
41. 6 MOORP, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1352 (2d ed. 1953), citing Guardian Trust
Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds,

231 U.S. 1 (1930). See also Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 186 F.2d 473, 481
(4th Cir. 1951). Cf. Russell v. Cunningham, 233 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1956)
Helene Curtis Industries v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 233 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1956).
42. 247 Fed. 487, 492 (2d Cir. 1917). See also NLRB v. Mastro Plastics,
43 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2179 (2d Cir. 1958) ; In re Federal Facilities Realty Co., 227

F.2d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Rivers v. Miller, 112 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1940) ;

Odell v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1937); Kreuter-

Arnold Hinge Last Co. v. Leman, 50 F.2d 699, 707 (1st Cir. 1931), aff'd (on the
issue of costs), 284 U.S. 449, 451 (1931) ; Schauffler v. Plumbers and Pipefitters,
148 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1956). See generally 17 C.J.S., Contempt § 127.
43. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1946) ; Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1910) ; In re Federal Facilities
Realty Co., supra note 42.
44. Buchhalter v. Rude, 54 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1932), rev'd, 286 U.S. 451
(1932) (because "bad faith" not established by competent evidence) ; Gold Dust
Corp. v. Hoffenberg, 13 F. Supp. 794 (W.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd, 87 F.2d 451, 453
(2d Cir. 1937) ; Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1934).
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This judicial treatment of counsel fees as part of the substantive
remedy in contempt proceedings appears warranted since, except in
cases where criminal contempt is alleged, but for the imposition of
costs the penalty in civil cases might have little deterrent value.
Further, this treatment also appears to be consistent with the general
interpretation given statutes which provide for an award of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party;45 when such a provision is expressly
granted by the legislative body, it must be alleged in the pleadings.
Yet, as to this latter point, it is not to be concluded that whenever a
statute speaks in terms of allowing attorney's fees that a right to
receive such an award becomes vested.46 For example, sections
1920(5) and 1923 of title 28 of the United States Code speak about
attorney's docket fees, yet the authority to tax such an item as costs,
being couched in permissive terms, may be granted or denied by the
court without its being subject to attack for abuse of discretion.
There are several provisions in the FRCP which bear on the
subject of attorney's fees but none treats such fees as costs; they
speak in terms of "reasonable expenses" and often provide that attorney's fees may additionally be assessed.47 However, even if any
one rule does not specifically mention attorney's fees, by the use of
labels such as "reasonable expenses" the court may just as effectively
tax attorney's fees as one of the conditions upon which relief shall
be granted, although the court would lack authority to tax such fees
as "costs." 48
45. In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 126 F.2d 607, 611 (10th Cir. 1942), the
court said:
"The fact that statutes providing for the assessment of attorney's fees designate them as costs does not make them such as that term is generally used
and understood. Statutes providing for attorney's fees impose a liability which
one may enforce as a matter of right. Such fees are put in controversy in
the suit and are a part of the substantive right" Missouri State Insurance
Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199 (attorney's fees treated as part of the recovery for
purposes of determining jurisdictional amount for removal to federal court.);
People of Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238. (Emphasis
supplied).
46. Cf. cases cited in note 22 supra.
47. Rule 41(d) (voluntary dismissal) ; rule 53(a) (compensation of master)
rule 75(e) (for violation of mandate that record be abbreviated, "costs may be
imposed upon offending attorneys or parties."); rule 30(d) (motion to terminate or
direct examination of depositions) ; rule 30(g) (for failure to attend or to serve
subpoena, and another party attends, court may order party to pay all reasonable
expenses including reasonable attorney's fees) ; rule 37(a) (refusal to answer
interrogatory, reasonable expenses and attorney's fees) ; rule 37(c) (refusal to
admit genuineness of documents or truth of matters of fact, reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees). Note that rule 37(f) states that, "Expenses and attorney's fees
are not to be imposed upon the United States under this rule."
48. Cf. 6 MOORe, FrDURAL PRACTICe 1356 (2d ed. 1953), where it is stated that
"orders for the advancement of expenses do not constitute the taxing of costs,
and are not conclusive as to who shall ultimately be taxed, if at all, with the expense involved."
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Referring again to section 1912 of the Judicial Code, Congress
gave wide discretion to the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal
in awarding "damages" and "costs." There are numerous cases in
which courts have exercised their discretion to award attorney's fees
pursuant to that section, but query, are these awards to be construed
.as "damages" or as "costs"? It has been held that, under ordinary
-circumstances, just damages for delays in litigation are not to include
attorney's fees,49 yet the Supreme Court has stated that attorney's
fees may be included in an award of damages where the appeal was
frivolous and taken merely to delay matters.5" Thus, although counsel fees are not to be construed as an element of costs, where courts
are given latitude in the exercise of their sound discretion, the assessment of such sums may be rationalized under the Code by merely
affixing the label, "damages."
Referring now to the label termed "expenses," it is beyond dispute that such term may include attorney's fees, and there is authority
to demonstrate that under appropriate circumstances, such an award
may be charged as an expense against the United States. In North
Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co. v. United States,5 the court directed the
United States to pay the libellant's counsel fees as a "condition" to
taking the deposition of a government witness. The court said:
The payment by the applicant for the deposition, to his adversary of the fees and expenses of the adversary's attorney
attending at the taking of the deposition, is neither a cost nor a
disbursement, as those terms are commonly understood in the
taxation thereof. .

.

. Under Rule 12 [local rule] the amount

thus advanced is retrievable as a disbursement if the defendant
[United States] ultimately recovers costs of the action. However,
the sum does not become a taxable disbursement until such time
as, and only in the event that, the right to tax costs accrues to
the litigant advancing it. The prohibition of 28 U.S.C. 2412 is
inapplicable thereto.5 2 (Emphasis added.)
The rationale of North Atlantic has been applied to many situations
where the court believes that such items of costs should be taxed in
favor of the prevailing party.
49. Gordon v. Woods, 202 F.2d 476 (1st Cir. 1953), where recovery on a
supersedeas bond was disallowed.
50. Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U.S. 102, 110 (1912). Accord,
Slaker v. O'Connor, 178 U.S. 188 (1929) ; Commercial Wholesalers v. Investors
,Commercial Corp., 172 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1949); In re Midland United Co., 141
F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1944).
51. 16 F.R. Serv. 306.41, case 2, aff'd 209 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1953).
52. Id. See also Ryan v. Arabian Oil Co., 18 F.R.D. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1955),
where Judge Bondy held that he was not foreclosed, by an order requiring "each
party to bear his own expenses in connection with the taking of the deposition",
from taxing such expenses as costs in favor of the prevailing party.
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The subject of attorney's fees is quite similar in principal to the

payment of fee expenses where reference to a special master is ordered.
Generally, where the court orders a reference to a master and the
parties acquiesce to the order, the compensation which is paid to the
master may be taxed against either or both parties. 3 This follows
from the discretion vested in the court under traditional equity
principles, rule 54(d) and the express terms of rule 53(a). Under
rule 53(a), the court is authorized to fix the compensation to be
allowed a master, and the payment of his fee and other expenses are
charged upon "such of the parties . . . as the court may direct."

The United States, when involved in litigation, is usually a party
and accordingly, its immunity under rule 54(d) should apply. In
addition, although it is generally conceded that the United States may
not waive a lawful defense by consenting to liability for costs,54 it is
common knowledge that in actual practice it often stipulates to share
"expenses," costs, when reference to a master is agreed upon among
the parties or ordered by the court. However, even in the absence of

stipulation or consent, the United States has been held liable for a
proportionate share of the "costs" 5 when reference to a master was
ordered.5"
53. Bowen Motor Coaches v. New York Cas. Corp., 139 F.2d 332, 334 (5th
Cir. 1944). In In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 315 (1920), the Supreme Court indicated that master's fees were like costs and that therefore the losing party should
be liable for their payment. That this statement no longer represents the law is
indicated in 6 MooR, F8DtRAL PRAC1rICt 1358 (2d ed. 1953). Cf. Dyker Bldg. Co.
v. United States, 132 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1950), where the court said that the
costs of reference may properly be taxed and be considered as "costs" within the
meaning of rule 54(d), and that costs shall therefore be allowed to the prevailing
party as of course.
54. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 20 (1926) ; Walling
v. Norfolk & So. R.R., 162 F.2d 95, 96 (4th Cir. 1947).
55. It is submitted that the decisions cited at note 56 infra, can be squared
with 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and rule 54(d) if the word "costs" as used in the courts'
statements are construed as being synonymous with expenses. However, even if
masters' fees are considered as costs, the fact that they are paid to a third-party
rather than to a party-litigant should be a sufficiently persuasive basis to justify
their assessment as not being within the prohibition of the code. Cf. Associated
Almond Growers v. Wymond, 69 F.2d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1934).
56. See N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, 130 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942), where
the Board was successful in a contempt proceeding. However, the court said,
"[T]he costs, including the Master's compensation [set at $6000], witnesses' and
stenographer's fees, are to be divided between the parties, two-thirds to be borne by
respondent and one-third by the Board." (Emphasis supplied.) N.L.R.B. v. Remington
Rand, supra at 937. See also Polish Nat'l Alliance v. N.L.R.B., 159 F.2d 38
(7th Cir. 1946), where again, the findings of the master indicated that the respondent was in contempt of the Board's order. This court said: "The Master is
allowed $600 as his fee in the matter, and the Board and Alliance are each directed
to pay one-half the costs of the reference, including the Master's fees and expenses."
(Emphasis supplied.) Polish Nat'l Alliance v. N.L.R.B., supra at 39. Compare
Aycrigg v. United States, 124 F. Supp 416 (D.C. Cal. 1954), where the United
States was not held liable for sharing the expenses which the prevailing party
unilaterally had advanced to the master.
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These decisions dealing with master's fees should not be construed as being necessarily atypical or inconsistent with the tenor
of the whole discussion of attorney's fees. After all, the requirement
for a master's services is really more like expenses, which must be
incurred to enable the court to render a decision, just as transcript
and filing fees are necessary expenditures incidental to the presentation of the matter before the court. If the matters are so complex
that a special master is required, apparently the court is poorly
equipped to make the findings upon which a decision could be predicated; and without a final decision there can be no award of costs.
Thus, these expenditures seem to be more than mere incidents of the
suit, they are absolutely necessary. Consequently, if a master's fees,
and the accompanying expenditures, are viewed as "expenses" rather
than conventional costs, the label would seem to justify the result,
as in other situations previously noted, where the award of attorney's
fees was upheld despite the prohibitions of section 2412 and rule
54(d).
CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion of attorney's fees should amply illustrate and point up the need which exists for affirmative legislation
to correct the imbalance existing between the government and its
opposing party-litigant. While in the Hull case, supra, the court
noted that a written contract or statute or rule of court could justify
the imposition of an award of attorney's fees against the unsuccessful
party, and while numerous statutes do exist which provide for the
allowance of an attorney's fee, the courts have been able to avoid
following the express terms of the statute, where inclined to do so, by
affixing a label to the services performed which lifts the subject from
the permissible category and places it in situ under a prohibitory
category. Even in those cases where courts are inclined favorably to
the successful party, there may at times be experienced a sense of
restraint, albeit self-imposed, lest the matter be considered by a reviewing court as falling within the statutory ban against awarding
"costs" where the United States does not prevail. The aura of
hesitancy which prevents a court from achieving justice through appropriate remedial power-granted orders is due, in large measure,
to the inaction of Congress in eliminating the statutory provisions
which the courts are bound to obey and enforce. No matter how
gravely the needs and experiences of present day litigation cry out
for a rejection of outmoded, unfair provisions, it would be a subversion
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of the statute and an unseemly arrogation of ungranted power, for
a court openly to deny the application of express statutory terms
where they clearly should apply. It would be inappropriate for a
court to aid one party one day without statutory reason lest it
disable the same party the next day without statutory cause.
The state of imbalance presently existing between the United
States and other parties litigant is the result of adherence to an
archaic concept of sovereign immunity and any alternative which
tends to equate the position of the individual with that of the government presents a salutary objective. Insofar as federal law prevents
the United States from being taxed for costs, the law should be
changed. The proposed change would remove costs from the field of
sovereign immunity and place the United States on an equal footing
with all other parties involved in litigation. Two alternatives are
submitted:
(1)

Congressional amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and

Supreme Court approval of amendment of rule 54(d) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing, in effect, that where
the United States is a party, neither the individual nor the United
States, whether either occupied the position of plaintiff or defendant, would be liable for paying, or benefit by receiving, an

award of costs; that each party is to bear his own costs without
reimbursement, regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
or
(2) By Congressional amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and
amendment of rule 54(d), to provide that the United States will
be liable for costs as any other unsuccessful litigant; that where
costs are taxed against the government such sums are to be
paid from a fund maintained by the particular agency or department involved in the litigation. (See 28 U.S.C. § 2408).
Similarly, all sums received by the government, which are in the
nature of costs, are to be deposited in this fund.
For the reasons already discussed, the second of these alternatives is
the more satisfactory and preferable solution.
It is for Congress to clear the books and supply the "reason" to
support the cause.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss2/3

22

